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Loss of Consortium and the Unmarried
Cohabitant: Bulloch v. United States
Traditionally, American courts have confined the tort action
of loss of consortium to a husband's interest in the consortium
of his wife.' The grounds for this restriction have not been
clear,' and in recent years many jurisdictions have recognized a
~
wife's equal interest in the consortium of her h u ~ b a n d .Attempts to extend the action beyond marriage have met with litHowever, in Bulloch v. United States/ the United
tle succe~s.~
States District Court for the District of New Jersey expanded
the action's boundaries and allowed an unmarried cohabitant to
sue for the loss of her partner's consortium.

On May 21, 1977, David K. Bulloch was injured in a scuba
diving accident off the coast of New Jersey. Three months earlier David and his wife, Edith, had divorced after twenty-six
years of marriage. In spite of their divorce, the Bullochs regularly communicated, and by the time of the accident the couple
had reconciled their differences, had decided to resume living together, and planned ultimately to remarry. Upon David's release
from the hospital the Bullochs began living together and discovered the accident had rendered David impotent. They did not
remarry, however, because they believed a formal marriage
would not be legally binding unless it could be consummated.
Nevertheless, the Bullochs held themselves out as husband and
wife and considered themselves married. Subsequently, David
Bulloch filed suit against the United States under the Federal
1. See Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 U . ILL. L.F. 493,494; Green,
Relational Interests, 29 Nw. U.L. REV.460,465-66 (1934); Holbrook, The Change in the
Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH.L. REV.1, 2 (1923); Pound, Individual Interests in the
Domestic Relations, 14 MICH.L. REV.177, 193-94 (1916).
2. Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2-4.
3. Comment, Loss of Consortium and Unmarried Cohabitors: An Examination of
Tong v. Jocson, 14 U.S.F.L. REV.133, 137 n.35 (1979).
4. See Chiesa v. Rowe, 486 F. Supp. 236 (W.D.
Mich. 1980); Tong v. Jocson, 76 Cal.
App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165 (Me. 1980).
5. 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980).
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Tort Claims Act6 and the Suits in Admiralty Act: and he was
joined by Edith, who claimed damages for loss of con~ortium.~
The government moved to dismiss Edith's claim, arguing
that marriage is a prerequisite to a loss of consortium action, but
the court denied the motion and held that Edith Bulloch qualified as a plaintiff in the action? In an effort to resolve the case
in accordance with New Jersey law, the district court grappled
with a number of possible theories behind the consortium action
and finally anchored its decision on the New Jersey policy of
extending tort actions to justly compensate injured parties.1°
This policy was expressed in Ekalo u. Constructive Service
Corp. of America,ll a case in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court extended the action for loss of consortium to include the
wife as a plaintiff. In Ekalo the court rejected the view held by
some jurisdictions that the consortium action should be abolished altogether rather than extended" and stated that, absent
sufficient countervailing policy considerations, tort actions
should be broadened to justly compensate proximately injured
parties." The Bulloch court recognized that New Jersey had
previously declined to create an action for children similar to
loss of consortium14 but determined that the policy considerations which led to that result were inapplicable to unmarried cohabitants? Finding no reasons to limit the consortium action to
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1976).
7. 46 U.S.C. 5 741 (1976).
8. 487 F. Supp. at 1079.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1082-86. The court focused on three possible purposes for the consortium
action. First, the court considered the action as a means for penalizing unmarried cohabitants for not marrying. Deciding that New Jersey did not intend to punish cohabitants
by denying them the action, the court rejected this view. Secondly, the court viewed the
action as a tool used by the state to encourage marriage. In discarding this theory, the
court noted it was unlikely people marry in order to have a loss of consortium action.
Finally, the court accepted the position that the purpose behind the consortium action
was to compensate those proximately injured by the tortious acts of others. Id.
11. 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965).
12. Id. at 93, 215 A.2d at 7.
13. Id. at 95, 215 A.2d at 8.
14. 487 F. Supp. at 1086 (citing Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d
862 (1972)).
15. The court limited its search for countervailing policies to those discussed in Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972), in which the court denied a
consortium-like claim by children. In that case the New Jersey court focused on
problems of increased tort liability, double recovery, remoteness, and speculativeness of
damages. The Bulloch court concluded these problems did not exist in the case of unmarried cohabitants. First, the court stated, since the extension to unmarried cohabi-
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marriage and characterizing consortium as a relational interest
that can exist outside of marriage, the court expanded the consortium boundaries to include any "person who, as a result of
tortious conduct, loses services, aid, comfort and conjugal fellowship of the type typically shared by spouses."16

The Bulloch court failed to recognize two significant reasons
not to extend the consortium action. First, shifting the consortium line from the objective test of marriage to an inherently
subjective test would thrust courts into an unwieldy case-by-case
evaluation of personal interests using uncertain and elusive standards. Secondly, such a shift ignores the differences between the
interests of married and unmarried persons in their respective
relationships.
If recovery is to be granted for third-party harm to personal
relationships, courts must have some guidelines to determine
which relationships actually deserve compensation. Arguably,
the courts could recognize harm to each type of sentimental relationship, using the quality of the relationship merely as a factor in awarding damages. However, such a course would increase
tort liability to a staggering degree and could fill the courts with
frivolous claims. For example, under this approach an accident
would not only leave the tortfeasor liable to the victim and his
spouse, it would also leave the courtroom door open to the victim's relatives, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances. For this
reason, courts have carefully limited recognition of relational
harm.17
Bulloch implicitly acknowledged the need to limit recovery
to deserving relationships; however, the court departed from the
traditional boundaries of consortium, asserting that some unmarrieds may suffer harm identical to that suffered by spouses.
tants involved the addition of only one companion claim, there was no danger of substantially expanding tort liability. Secondly, the court considered the fear of double
recovery unfounded in Bulloch because juries do not assume the presence of a cohabiting
partner when awarding damages and so do not include the partner's suffering to any
extent. Finally, the court felt that problems of remoteness and speculativeness of damages did not outweigh the need for compensation because the Ekalo court had held that
such injuries are proximately caused by tortious injury to the spouse and damages would
be no more speculative in the case of unmarried cohabitants than in the case of husband
and wife. 487 F. Supp. at 1086-87.
16. 487 F. Supp. at 1088.
17. See generally Foster, note 1 supra; Green, note 1 supra; Pound, note 1 supra.
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Therefore, rather than fixing the borders of recognized interests
at a well-marked legal relationship, the court created an elusive
line defined by the quality of a party's expectations and interests in any given relationship. Stating merely that judges and
juries can undoubtedly separate "wheat from ch&,"18 the court
gave no guidelines by which to determine that a party's frustrated expectations rise to the level of losses "typically shared
by spouses." Must one have an expectation in the services, aid,
comfort, and sexual relations of another before damage to any
one of those expectations is compensable? Is an expectation in
the sexual relations of another party essential to the action? If
so, does harm to homosexual relations also qualify for compensation? If not, may close friends who expect services, aid, and
comfort but not sexual relations also be entitled to recovery?
What if one party's expectations do not coincide with those of
the other party-which party's expectations determine the quality of the relationship? Such questions illustrate the difficulty of
administering a line which hinges on subjective judgments about
personal relationships and individual expectations.lS
This shift from clarity to ambiguity was apparently
prompted by the perceived injustice of refusing Edith Bulloch's
claim. However, the drawing of legal lines necessarily leaves
some parties so close to the line that not allowing their claims
appears unfair. This is true no matter where the line is drawn.
Shifting the line to include those close to it only moves the
boundaries of recognized interests and brings another group
close to the line. The Bulloch court tried to avoid this problem
by defining the line by the nature of the loss suffered rather
than the type of relationship involved. This solution has the virtue of eliminating a seemingly arbitrary bar to recovery; however, it also effectively eliminates line-drawing altogether leaving
the court to struggle with the cumbersome process of adjudicating interests in innumerable relationships.
It is doubtful that any attempt to draw the consortium
boundaries around sentimental relationships which are not also
18. 487 F. Supp. at 1088.
19. The problems of subjective analysis in the consortium area are certainly not
new. Even within the clearly marked boundaries of marriage, subjectivity is required to
determine the amount of harm to the relationship. However, subjective judgments in the
awarding of damages do not bring with them the problems of unlimited liability and
frivolous claims that accompany a subjective approach to determining qualified
plaintiffs.
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well-defined legal relationships will result in a line that can be
objectively administered. Personal relationships vary so greatly
in content and form that accurate assumptions about the expectations of unmarried cohabitants as a group cannot be made. On
the other hand, accurate and justifiable assumptions can be
made about expectations within marriage. Marriage differs from
the relationship shared by unmarried cohabitants in that marital
expectations are accompanied by legal commitment. Marriage
entails a legally and socially recognized commitment to furnish
such things as service, aid, comfort, and sexual relations to one's
spouse. Although it is impossible to enforce these personal obligation~,'~the existence of such a commitment permits the court
to assume that but for the tortious conduct of a third party
those promises would be kept. Unmarried cohabitants, by choosing to forego formal marriage, indicate their commitment to the
relationship is not as serious as that in marriage. Since relationships outside of marriage are not surrounded by such serious
commitments, the justifiable expectations parties to non-marital
relationships have in the future companionship of their partners
do not rise to the level of marital expectations. Because the consortium action assumes the aggrieved party has a right to expect
the continued enjoyment of his or her partner's consortium, the
element of marital commitment provides the courts with both a
workable and logical place to draw the action's boundaries.
In limiting the action for loss of consortium to marriage,
courts have implicitly recognized the distinctions between married and unmarried relationships. Generally, courts have viewed
the right of consortium as "grow[ing] out of the marriage relationship,'"' and consortium has basically come to represent the
legal and social incidents of marriage.aa According to one court,
the right of consortium arises because of the duties and obligations both husband and wife take upon themselves in marriage.2s
Most recently the concept of consortium springing from marriage has been reatlirmed by a number of courts dealing with
20. Professor Clark maintains rights of consortium within marriage are enforced indirectly. "Divorce is one such way. The spouse who does not live up to his obligations in
specified respects may find himself the losing defendant in a divorce action." H. CLARK,
THE LAWOF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS
IN THE UNITED
STATES
5 10.1, at 262 (1968).
& F. J-,
21. Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165, 166 (Me. 1980). See 1 F. HARPER
THE LAW OF TORTS
5 8.9 (1956); W.PROSSER,
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF TORTS
5 124, at
874 (4th ed. 1971).
22. H. C L A ~supra
,
note 20, at 261.
23. Harris v. Kunkel, 227 Wis. 435, 437, 278 N.W. 868, 869 (1938).
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loss of consortium claims by parties not married at the time of
the accident." In denying these claims, the courts emphasized
that the interests involved in a consortium action exist only
within the marriage relationship. The Bulloch court stands virtually alone in its treatment of consortium as a relational interest that can exist outside of marriage. This is largely because in
Bulloch the court ignored the heightened interest the marital
commitment creates and merely declared it "obvious that a
member of a cohabiting couple can suffer identical damage to
that suffered by a spouse."26 Thus, not only is the Bulloch line
unworkable, but it also is based on an assumption that has been
constructively rejected by most other courts.

In extending the loss of consortium action beyond marriage,
the Bulloch court neglected the distinctions between married
and unmarried persons and failed to consider the problems involved in moving the consortium boundaries from the objective
test of marriage to the elusive subjective test of "typical loss."
The court should have denied Edith Bulloch's claim and confined the action to the marriage relationship, which provides
both a judicially workable and logically justifiable place to set
the bounds of consortium.

Paul D. Ellsworth

24. See Chiesa v. Rowe, 486 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Tong v. Jocson, 76 Cal.
App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165 (Me. 1980).
25. 487 F. Supp. at 1085.

